The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law

CUA Law Scholarship Repository
Scholarly Articles and Other Contributions

Faculty Scholarship

2001

May the Child Online Protection Act Rely on Community
Standards to Identify Material that is Harmful to Minors?
Susanna Frederick Fischer
The Catholic University, Columbus School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/scholar
Part of the Communications Law Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, and the Internet Law
Commons

Recommended Citation
Susanna Frederick Fischer, May the Child Online Protection Act Rely on Community Standards to Identify
Material that is Harmful to Minors?, 2001-2002 PREVIEW U.S. SUP. CT. CAS. 170 (2001).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at CUA Law Scholarship
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Articles and Other Contributions by an authorized
administrator of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu.

FIRST

AMENDMENT

May the Child Online Protection Act Rely
on Community Standards to Identify Material
That IsHarmful to Minors?
by Susanna FrederickFischer
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 170-174. © 2001 American Bar Association.

is "obscene" or that satisfies a
three-part test, namely, material
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that
(A) the average person, applying contemporary community
standards, would find, taking
the material as a whole and
with respect to minors, is
designed to appeal to, or is
designed to pander to, the
prurient interest;
(B) depicts, describes, or represents, in a manner patently
offensive with respect to
minors, an actual or simulated
sexual act or sexual contact, an
actual or simulated normal or
perverted sexual act, or a lewd
exhibition of the genitals or
post-pubescent female breast;
and
(C) taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for
minors.
47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6). "Minors" are
defined by COPA as persons under
the age of 17. 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(7).

ISSUE
Does the Child Online Protection
Act (COPA) violate the First
Amendment by relying on contemporary community standards to
determine whether material on the
World Wide Web is harmful to
minors?

FACTS
COPA was enacted into law on Oct.
21, 1998. It prohibits an individual
or entity from "knowingly and with
knowledge of the character of the
material, in interstate or foreign
commerce by means of the World
Wide Web, mak[ing] any communication for commercial purposes that
is available to any minor and that
includes any material that is harmful to minors." 47 U.S.C. §
231(a)(1). Violations are subject to
civil and criminal sanctions, including imprisonment up to six months,
fines, and civil penalties of up to
$50,000 per violation. 47 U.S.C. §
231(a)(1)-(3).

ASHCROFT V. AMERICAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION ET AL.

DOCKET No. 00-1293
ARGUMENT DATE:
NOVEMBER 28, 2001
FROM: THE THIRD CIRCUIT

COPA defines "material that is
harmful to minors" as material that
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COPA provides for an affirmative
defense when a defendant "in good
faith, has restricted access by
minors to material that is harmful
to minors" by "reasonable measures
that are feasible under available
technology," including the imposition of a requirement to use a credit
card, debit account, adult access
code or adult personal identification
number, or through the acceptance
of a digital age-verification certificate. 47 U.S.C. § 231(c)(1).
On the day after COPA's enactment,
the American Civil Liberties Union
and other plaintiffs (collectively,
ACLU) filed suit in the United
States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, challenging
COPA's constitutionality and seeking to enjoin the government from
enforcing it.

rent technological impossibility of
restricting minors from accessing
chat rooms and discussion groups
other than by screening all users
would impose an undue burden on
speech that was constitutionally
protected for adults. The government was not likely to satisfy its
burden to prove that COPA was the
least restrictive means to achieve its
compelling interest. The district
court found that the use of blocking
and filtering technologies, though
imperfect, would likely be just as
effective as COPA and would impose
a lesser burden on constitutionally
protected speech.

The district court granted a temporary restraining order prohibiting
the government from enforcing
COPA. This temporary order was
later briefly extended on consent.
Plaintiffs then moved for a preliminary injunction. After holding
extensive evidentiary hearings, the
district court granted the plaintiffs'
motion on the basis that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the
merits of their claim that COPA was
unconstitutional. The district court
found that COPA was a contentbased regulation of speech that was
subject to a strict scrutiny analysis.
Although the government had a
compelling interest in protecting
minors from harmful materials that
were not obscene by adult standards, the plaintiffs were likely to
establish at trial that COPA would
unduly burden speech that is constitutionally protected for adults.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit affirmed the district
court, but on a different ground first
raised by the Third Circuit on oral
argument. Although the Third
Circuit agreed that COPA was subject to a strict scrutiny analysis and
that it was undisputed that the government had a compelling interest
in protecting minors from harmful
materials, even if these were not
obscene by adult standards, the
Third Circuit did not agree that the
government could not establish that
COPA was the least restrictive
means to achieve this compelling
interest. Rather, the Third Circuit
took issue with the "contemporary
community standards" aspect of
COPA, finding that this was unconstitutionally overbroad in the Web
context. The Third Circuit reasoned
that since Web publishers lacked
the ability to control the geographic
distribution of their publications,
the "contemporary community
standards" criterion would result in
every Web communication being
required to comply with the most
restrictive community's standards.

In particular, it was likely that
COPA would excessively chill publications by Web publishers who bore
the costs of implementing age-verification technologies. Also, the cur-

The government's petition for
rehearing was denied. After two
extensions of time, the Supreme
Court granted the government's
petition for review of the Third

Circuit's decision. 121 S.Ct. 1997
(2001).
CASE ANALYSIS
The parties agree that COPA regulates speech based on its content,
which is presumptively invalid
under the First Amendment and
subject to a strict scrutiny analysis.
To survive constitutional scrutiny,
COPA must be supported by a compelling government interest, and it
also must be the least restrictive
and most narrowly tailored means
to further that interest.
In the "real world" context of traditional media sold in physical space,
many states have laws regulating
the sale of materials that are harmful to minors although not obscene
for adults. In Ginsberg v. New York,
390 U.S. 629 (1968), the Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality
of a New York statute that prohibited the sale to minors of magazines
that were obscene as to minors,
though not obscene for adults. Since
Ginsberg, many states have enacted
"blinder" laws that regulate not only
the sale of materials that are harmful to minors but also the display of
such materials. A number of federal
courts of appeals and state courts
have ruled that such blinder laws
are constitutional. See, e.g.,
Crawford v. Lungren, 96 F.3d 380
(9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520
U.S. 1117 (1997), American
Booksellers Ass'n v. Virginia, 882
F.2d 125 (4th Cir.1989), cert.
denied, 494 U.S. 1056 (1990),
American Booksellers v. Webb, 919
F.2d 1493 (11th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 500 U.S. 942 (1991), DavisKidd Booksellers, Inc. v. McWherter,
866 S.W.2d 520 (Tenn. 1993).
The problem of regulating materials
that are "harmful to minors" and
disseminated in cyberspace arose in
the mid-1990s after the Internet
became a widely used communica(Continued on Page 172)
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tions medium in the United States.
Congress first addressed this problem in the Telecommunications Act
of 1996. Title V of this act, entitled
the Communications Decency Act
of 1996 (CDA), prohibited the
knowing transmission to minors
over the Internet of obscene or
indecent messages, 47 U.S.C. §
223(a) (informally known as the
"indecent transmission" provision),
as well as using the Internet to
knowingly send or display, in a
manner available to minors, material that is "patently offensive as measured by contemporary community
standards," 47 U.S.C. § 223(d)
(informally known as the "patently
offensive display" provision). The
CDA contained two affirmative
defenses. One applied to defendants
who took reasonable and effective
actions to limit access by minors to
prohibited material. 47 U.S. C. §
223(e)(5)(A). The second applied to
defendants who restricted access to
such material through the use of
certain specified forms of age verification. 47 U.S.C. § 223(e)(5)(B).
In Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844
(1997), the Supreme Court found
that both the indecent transmission
provision and the patently offensive
display provision violated the First
Amendment. While the Court found
that the government had a compelling interest in protecting minors
from indecent and patently offensive communications, the government had failed to prove that the
challenged provisions of the CDA
were the least restrictive alternative
available to further that compelling
interest. The Court found that the
Internet's lack of geographical
boundaries meant that the CDA's
"contemporary community standards" criterion would subject all
Internet material to the standards of
the most restrictive community.
Moreover, the Court found the CDA
to be unconstitutionally overbroad

because it applied to large amounts
of non-pornographic material with
serious educational or other value.
The Court found that the CDA to be
significantly broader than the
"harmful to minors" statute found
constitutional in Ginsberg because
(1) the CDA was not limited to commercial transactions; (2) the CDA,
unlike the Ginsberg statute, failed
to contain any exception for parents
who permitted their children to
view the prohibited material; (3) the
CDA's key terms, indecent and
patently offensive, were undefined
and also failed to exempt material
that was of serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value; (4) the
CDA's definition of minors as those
under 18 years of age would include
many first-year college students,
unlike the Ginsberg statute, which
limited minors to those under 17.
Nor did the CDA's affirmative
defenses amount to sufficiently narrow tailoring to save the CDA from
unconstitutional overbreadth.
According to the district court's
findings of fact, existing technologies were not yet effective in blocking minors' access to harmful materials, nor in verifying age in chat
rooms, e-mail, mail exploders, or
newsgroups. Moreover, again relying
on the district court's findings of
fact, the Court noted that the adoption of age-verification technology
was not economically feasible for
most noncommercial Web sites.
In enacting COPA, Congress has
attempted to address all of the
Court's concerns about the CDA's
vagueness and overbreadth. The
government argues that this retailoring has resulted in a statute that
successfully stands up to constitutional scrutiny as the least restrictive alternative to further the compelling interest in protecting minors
from harmful material. The government points out that COPA is now
limited only to commercial entities,
who can bear the costs of imple-
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menting age-verification technologies. Also, COPA applies only to
Web communications, for which age
screening is technologically and
economically feasible according to
the district court's findings of fact.
Moreover, COPA's definition of
minor has been more narrowly tailored to track the Ginsberg statute's
definition of persons under 17
years. Furthermore, COPA now
specifically contains a definition of
"material that is harmful to minors"
that tracks the three prongs of the
Ginsberg test.
In light of the finding of the court of
appeals that COPA is the least
restrictive means to further the government's compelling interest, the
government's principal argument is
that COPA's reliance on community
standards in its definition of harmful materials is constitutionally
acceptable. The government contends that community standards are
an established component of state
"harmful to minors" statutes that
have been held constitutional in
regulating the real-world sale and
display of material that is obscene
for minors though not for adults.
Moreover, it is not unreasonable to
hold commercial entities to the
standards of each community in the
nation where such entities have
chosen to obtain the advantage of
nationwide markets by displaying
material nationwide on the World
Wide Web. In support, the government relies on two previous
Supreme Court decisions upholding
the constitutionality of applying
community standards to determine
the issue of obscenity under federal
statutes. Hamling v. United States,
418 U.S. 87 (1974), concerned a law
prohibiting mailing obscene material, and Sable Communications,Inc.
v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989), concerned a law prohibiting obscene
telephone messages. The government also contends that applicable
community standards are likely to
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be reasonably constant throughout
the nation.
Additionally, the government contends that COPA is saved from
unconstitutional overbreadth by its
"serious value prong" that excludes
material of "serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value."
This prong does not incorporate a
community-standards test, thus limiting COPA's application to clearly
pornographic material. Thus, the
government argues that COPA does
not impose an undue burden on
speech because it is primarily
directed to commercial pornographers who already make use of ageverification screens to block access
to most of their material that is
harmful to minors. According to the
government, COPA's main effect will
be to require these commercial
pornographers to place their teasers
(free pornographic material provided as an enticement to purchase
additional pornography) behind ageverification screens. Insofar as there
may be any significant variance in
community standards, the burden
on adult access to pornographic
material is modest in that it
requires only that somewhat more
material must be placed behind ageverification screens. That burden is
outweighed by the compelling interest in protecting minors from harmful material.
In response, the ACLU argues not
only that COPA's contemporary
community-standards test is unconstitutional, but also that COPA mirrors the CDA in its unconstitutional
overbreadth and failure to meet the
strict-scrutiny test. The ACLU
argues that COPA's communitystandards test is unconstitutional in
that it subjects all communications
on the Internet to a national mandate equal to the standards of the
most restrictive community in the
nation. The ACLU contends that
unlike telephone or mail communi-

cations, the Internet is a communications medium for which access
cannot be limited based on a user's
geographic location. Moreover, the
ACLU argues that the government
has failed to establish that community standards are reasonably constant throughout the United States.
The ACLU also argues that COPA is
unconstitutionally overbroad in that
it invalidly suppresses a wide range
of speech that is constitutionally
protected for adults under the guise
of protecting children. The ACLU
takes issue with the government's
contention that COPA is directed
primarily to commercial pornographers and that COPA's principal
effect would be to require these
commercial pornographers to place
their teasers behind age-verification
screens. The ACLU contends that
COPA applies broadly to all Web
speech, so long as the speaker is
funded through advertising.
Moreover, COPA's affirmative
defenses do not save it from violating the First Amendment because
the effect of these affirmative
defenses is to prevent or deter
adults from accessing constitutionally protected speech. According to
the ACLU, COPA is not narrowly
tailored to further the government's
asserted interest in protecting
minors from harmful material
because the district court found that
parental use of blocking software is
an effective and less restrictive
alternative to COPA's criminal
penalties.
SIGNIFICANCE
The significance of this case is
immense, not only for the debate
over the proper balance between
protecting children from World
Wide Web pornography and the protection of free speech, but also for
the broader problem of Internet regulation generally. The ease with
which children can access pornographic materials on the World Wide

Web is a matter of widespread concern. One significant aspect of this
decision will be to determine who
bears the burden of implementing
blocking or filtering technologies to
restrict access by minors to harmful
materials. If the government prevails, Web content providers will
bear this burden, while a ruling in
the ACLU's favor would mean that
the burden of implementing enduser blocking or filtering technologies rests instead on parents. The
decision is thus likely to have a significant impact on the broader
question of the extent to which the
government should assist parents
in their primary responsibility
to supervise the welfare of their
children.
This case is also highly significant in
that it presents the difficult challenge of determining the extent to
which cyberspace differs from the
physical world. If the government
prevails, Web businesses may have
to conform to community standards
nationwide. But if the ACLU prevails, there is a risk that "realworld" state "harmful to minors"
laws will be rendered meaningless
by the widespread availability of
pornographic material on the World
Wide Web. On a more abstract level,
this issue is significant for the ongoing debate over the extent to which
the Internet can and should be regulated by national law. Some commentators, such as David Johnson
and David Post, have endorsed the
view that the absence of territorial
borders in cyberspace renders
cyberspace so unique that national
laws are an entirely ineffective
method of regulation and an entirely new system of transnational
cyberspace law is required. See
David Johnson & David Post, "Law
and Borders-The Rise of Law in
Cyberspace," 48 Stanford L. Rev.
1367 (1996). Other commentators,
such as Jack Goldsmith, have con(Continued on Page 174)
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tended that the Internet is not significantly different from other communications media and can thus be
adequately regulated by territorially
based systems of national law. See
Jack L. Goldsmith,'"The Internet
and the Abiding Significance of
Territorial Sovereignty," 5 Indiana
J. Global Legal Studies 475 (Spring
1998). A ruling in favor of the government in this case would support
the contention that the Internet has
similarities to other communications media, specifically telephone
and mail, while a ruling in favor of
the ACLU would further the contention that the Internet is a truly
unique communications medium.

ATTORNEYS FOR THE

In Support of the American Civil
Liberties Union et al.
American Society of Journalists
and Authors et al. (Carl A. Solano
(215) 751-2000)
Association of National
Advertisers, Inc. (Steven G. Brody
(212) 556-2100)
The Chamber of Commerce of
the United States of America et al.
(Jodie L. Kelley (202) 639-6000)
The Society for the Scientific
Study of Sexuality et al. (Marjorie
Heins (212) 807-6222)
Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts et
al. (James E. Hough (212) 4688000)
Association of American
Publishers, Inc. et al. (R. Bruce Rich
(212) 310-8000)

PARTIES
For John Ashcroft, Attorney
General of the United States
(Theodore B. Olson, Solicitor
General, U.S. Department of Justice
(202) 514-2217)
For the American Civil Liberties
Union et al. (Ann E. Beeson,
American Civil Liberties Union
Foundation (212) 549-2500)

AMIcus BRIEFS
In Support of John Ashcroft,
Attorney General of the United
States
California State Senator
Raymond N. Hayes et al. (Richard
D. Ackerman (760) 741-8086)
Morality in Media, Inc. (Paul J.
McGeady (212) 870-3232)
County of Du Page, Illinois
(Richard Hodyl Jr. (312) 443-3200)
American Center for Law and
Justice (Jay A. Sekulow (202) 5468890)
Wallbuilders, Inc. (Barry C.
Hodge (757) 463-6133)

174

Issue No. 3

American Bar Association

175

Adarand Constructors,Inc. v. Mineta
et al. -

Kansas v. Crane -

92

61
Kelly v. South Carolina-

Alabama v. Shelton -

141

70
Lee v. Kemna -

106

Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties
Union et al. -

170

Massanariv. Sigmon Coal Co., Inc.
et al. -

96

Ashcroft et al. v. The Free Speech
Coalition et al. -

80

Mathias et al. v. Worldcom
Technologies, Inc. et al. -

Chao v. MallardBay Drilling, Inc.
-58
ChickasawNation et al. v. United
States -

32

City of Los Angeles v. Alameda
Books, Inc. et al. -

122

CorrectionalServices Corporationv.
Malesko - 40
Dusenbery v. United States -

75

Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission v. Waffle House, Inc.
-8
Great-West Life et al. v. Knudson
et vir -

44

J.E.M. Ag Supply et al. v. Pioneer
Hi-Bred International-

4

McKune et al. v. Lile Mickens v. Taylor -

131

149

111

National Cable and Telecommunications Association et al. v. Gulf Power
Company et al. and Federal
Communications Commission and
United States et al. v. Gulf Power
Company et al. -

12

New York et al. v. FederalEnergy
Regulatory Commission et al. and
Enron Power Marketing, Inc. v.
FederalEnergy Regulatory
Commission et al. -

36

Owasso Independent School District
v. Falvo -

145

Raygor et al. v. Regents of the
University of Minnesota -

135

Issue No. 3

Thomas et al. v. Chicago Park
District -

153

Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky, Inc. v.
Williams -

85

TRW Inc. v. Andrews -

17

United States v. Arvizu -

160

United States v. Knights -

United States v. Vonn -

101

89

United States PostalService v.
Gregory -

23

U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett -

165

Verizon Communications Inc. et al. v.
FederalCommunications
Commission et al. -

27

Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Public
Service Commission of Maryland and
United States v. Public Service
Commission of Maryland -

157

Wisconsin Department of Health and
Family Services v. Blumer -

American Bar Association

127

ADA

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky, Inc. v.
Williams -

85

U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett -

165

Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission v. Waffle House, Inc.
-8

EMPLOYMENT LAW

ADMIRALTY

Chao v. Mallard Bay Drilling, Inc.
-58

Gregory -

23

ENERGY LAW

CIVIL RIGHTS

New York et al. v. Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission et al. and
Enron Power Marketing, Inc. v.
Federal Energy Regulatory

Adarand Constructors,Inc. v.
Mineta et al. -

United States Postal Service v.

61

Commission et al. -

CONSUMER LAW

TRW Inc. v. Andrews -

36

17

ERISA
Great-West Life et al. v. Knudson

CRIMINAL LAW

United States v. Vonn -

et vir -

89

44

FIFTH AMENDMENT

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Alabama v. Shelton -

McKune et al. v. Lile -

70

149

FIRST AMENDMENT

DEATH PENALTY

Kelly v. South Carolina-

Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties

141

Union et al. -

170

Ashcroft et al. v. The Free Speech
DUE PROCESS

Coalition et al. -

Dusenbery v. United States Kansas v. Crane -

75

92

EDUCATION LAW

80

City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books,
Inc. et al. -

122

Thomas et al. v. Chicago Park
District- 153

Owasso Independent School District
v. Falvo -

145

Issue No. 3

FOURTH AMENDMENT

TELECOMMUNICATIONS

United States v. Arvizu

-

United States v. Knights -

Mathias et al. v. Worldcom

160

Technologies, Inc. et al. -

101

National Cable and Telecommunications Association et al. v. Gulf Power
Company et al. and Federal
Communications Commission and
United States et al. v. Gulf Power

HABEAS CORPUS

Lee v. Kemna

-

106

Company et al. HEALTH BENEFITS

Commission et al. -

27

Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Public
Service Commission of Maryland and
United States v. Public Service

INDIAN RIGHTS

Chickasaw Nation et al. v. United
States - 32

Commission of Maryland -

JURISDICTION

Raygor et al. v. Regents of the
University of Minnesota - 135

MEDICAID

Wisconsin Department of Health
and Family Services v. Blumer
127

PATENTS

J.E.M. Ag Supply et al. v. Pioneer
Hi-Bred International- 4

PRISONERS' RIGHTS

CorrectionalServices Corporation
v. Malesko - 40

SIXTH AMENDMENT

American Bar Association

12

Verizon Communications Inc. et al. v.
Federal Communications

Massanariv. Sigmon Coal Co., Inc.
et al. - 96

Mickens v. Taylor -

131

111

179

157

Burdens/Standards of Proof As a general matter, the party in a
lawsuit asserting a claim or defense
has the burden of presenting evidence that establishes the claim or
defense. This is known as the
burden of proof.
There are three burdens of
proof. From the least to the most
demanding, they are the preponderance-of-the-evidence burden of
proof; the clear-and-convincing
burden of proof; and the beyond-areasonable-doubt burden of proof.
The first two burdens can apply in
either criminal or civil cases, while
the third applies only in criminal
cases and then only to the
prosecution.
There are no ready definitions
for these burdens. There are, however, working definitions. Under
the preponderance standard, the
party with the burden of proof is
required to come forward with
credible evidence establishing that
a claim or defense is more likely
true than not. Under the clear-andconvincing standard, the party
with the burden of proof is expected to present evidence establishing
that the claim or defense is quite
likely true. Under the beyond-areasonable doubt standard, the
prosecution must present such
evidence of the defendant's guilt
that a reasonable person would
not hesitate to find the defendant
guilty. See Victor v. Nebraska,
114 S. Ct. 1239 (1994).
Class Action Lawsuit - As a general rule, a class action lawsuit is
one in which one or several named
individuals sue for themselves and
others believed to have sustained
injuries or losses similar to those
sustained by the named plaintiffs,
but who, at the time the case is
filed, are unknown both as to their
identities and their actual numbers. In order for a plaintiffs lawsuit to be given class action status,
the named plaintiff must show that
(1) the class is so large as to make
it impracticable to specify each
and every plaintiff by name,
(2) there exist questions of law or
fact common to all members of the

plaintiff class, (3) the claims of the
named plaintiffs are representative
of the claims of the unnamed
plaintiffs, and (4) the named plaintiffs can fairly and adequately represent the interests of the entire
plaintiff class. (Note: Less common
is the class action lawsuit in which
the class is composed of named
and unnamed defendants or in
which both the plaintiffs and
the defendant's side of the case
constitute a class.)
Collateral review (see also habeas
corpus) - Collateral review is the
criminal law's fail-safe mechanism.
It is intended to ensure that a conviction and sentence satisfy the
requirements imposed by law,
constitutional and statutory. As its
name suggests, collateral review
looks at a convicted defendant's
trial and in some cases the sentencing proceeding; it is not, however, a second trial. As a general
rule, collateral review is limited
to issues of law.
To be eligible for collateral
review, the petitioning party must
be in custody at the time the
process begins. Typically but not
necessarily, custody means imprisonment. For those convicted of
state-law crimes, collateral review
is available under state law and federal law, the latter in the form of a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
As a general rule, state-law petitioners must exhaust all avenues of
collateral review under state law
before filing a federal habeas
corpus petition. For federal-law
petitioners, federal habeas corpus
review is available after certain
post-conviction avenues such as a
motion to vacate a conviction or
sentence have been exhausted.
For both state-law and federallaw petitioners, federal habeas corpus review begins in a trial-level
court but in the collateral-review
context, the trial court functions as
a reviewing court. However, if the
federal habeas corpus petitioner is
unsuccessful in habeas court, he or
she is permitted, within limiting
procedural rules, to seek further
review of the habeas court's

decision in the appropriate intermediate federal appeals court and
if unsuccessful there, in the
Supreme Court.
Damages - In law, damages means
money given to a party whose legal
interests have been injured. While
there are several types of damages
that can be given to an injured
party, two of the most prominent
types are compensatory damages
and punitive damages.
An award of compensatory
damages is a sum of money
intended to make the injured party
whole, insofar as this is possible.
An award of punitive damages is
intended to punish the wrongdoer
in order to deter future wrongdoing.
Usually, punitive damages go to the
injured party and are over and
above any award of compensatory
damages. However, in some states,
a portion of any punitive damages
award goes to the state treasury.
Direct review - In American criminal law, a defendant is tried once,
but the trial itself can be reviewed
many times by many appellate
courts. One channel of review is
called direct review because it is
initiated by a first appeal as a matter of statutory right. Direct review
also is wide-ranging review because
the convicted defendant is permitted to raise all procedurally proper
issues regarding the trial court's
disposition of his or her case including issues of law, issues of
fact, issues concerning the trial
judge's use of discretion.
If the first appeal is resolved
against the convicted defendant,
appellate rules permit the defendant to seek discretionary review
by still higher courts, generally by
the highest court of the convicting
state and then by the United States
Supreme Court. (In federal criminal cases, the convicted defendant's
initial appeal as a matter of right is
to a circuit court of appeals and
then as a matter of discretion to
the Supreme Court.) If these courts
decline to hear the defendant's
case, hear the case but decide
against the defendant, or if the
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defendant defaults on his or her
right to seek discretionary review,
the direct review process ends and
it is said that the defendant's conviction and sentence are final. At
this point, the only avenue of relief
from a conviction or sentence retrial, resentencing, or outright
release - is collateral review
defined above.
Discovery - Discovery is a
pretrial device in which each party
to a lawsuit seeks information from
the other party as well as from nonparties believed to have knowledge
relevant to the issues in the case.
The plaintiff seeks information
through discovery to make his or
her case; the defendant seeks
information to support any
defenses that may be available.
Diversity - This term is used
whenever a federal court has jurisdiction over a case that does not
involve a question of federal law.
While there are several types of
diversity jurisdiction, the most
common type has two requirements: (1) the plaintiff and the
defendant are residents of different
states; (2) the dollar amount of the
dispute between the parties is at
least $75,000, exclusive of interest
and costs.
Habeas corpus - Under the federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C.
§2254 (1994), a person held in
state/local custody who believes
that his or her custody violates
federal law - typically, the
Constitution - may challenge that
custody by filing a petition for a
writ (i.e., an order) of habeas corpus in federal district court. If the
petitioner wins, he or she must be
released or retried, at the option of
the prosecuting authority.
In banc- In banc (sometimes
spelled en banc) literally means
"full bench." The term applies to
those courts - typically, intermediate appellate courts - in which
more than one judge, but less than
all judges of the court, hears a
case. As a general rule, when an
appellate court sits in banc, all

American Bar Association

active judges sit. However, in the
federal system, some circuit courts
of appeals have so many active
judges, e.g., the Ninth Circuit
with 28 judges, that sitting literally
in banc is not feasible. Thus, for
those circuits with 15 or more
active judges, the size of an in
banc court is set by circuit rule.
Currently, in banc courts in the
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth
Circuits are composed of fewer
than the entire court, with the
exact number varying by circuit
according to circuit rule.
Per curiam opinion - This term
literally means "the opinion of the
court," the Supreme Court or any
appellate court. Because the opinion
is the court's opinion, there is no
indication of which justice/judge
wrote it.
Plurality opinion - This term
denotes an opinion of the United
States Supreme Court in which
there is no majority opinion; that
is, fewer than a bare majority of
five justices were able to agree on
the legal basis for the Court's
action in affirming, reversing, or
vacating a lower court decision.
In some cases, the Court's
opinion can be a partialplurality
opinion. A partial plurality opinion
is one in which at least one part
of the opinion represents the views
of four or fewer Justices. For an
example of a partial plurality opinion, see Hubbard v. United States,
115 S. Ct. 1754 (1995) (Parts IV
and V, a plurality of three Justices;
Parts 1, 11, 111, and VI, a majority of
six Justices).
Preemption - Under the
Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST. art.
VI, § 2, federal law - whether
based on the Constitution, a
statute, or a treaty - takes precedence over state or local law on the
same matter. In other words, if
federal law addresses a matter,
either expressly or by implication,
it trumps and renders unenforceable any state or local law on the
matter.

Qualified Immunity - Qualified
immunity is a defense that can be
raised by a government employee
whenever there is uncertainty
about the lawfulness or unlawfulness of certain actions taken by the
employee, actions claimed by the
plaintiff to be unlawful. A government employee can avoid a trial
under this defense if the employee
can show that, at the time of the
complained-of action, he or she
could not have known that it
violated the law.
Strict scrutiny - Strict scrutiny is
a searching level of judicial review
applied to governmental actions
- federal, state, and local challenged as unconstitutional.
Strict scrutiny requires the
governmental actor to show that
it had a compelling reason to
take the challenged action and that
the action taken goes no further
than necessary - is narrowly
tailored - to advance the cited
compelling reason.
Summary judgment - This is the
name of a procedural device available to either party to a civil lawsuit
that enables one or the other party
to win without a trial. A party seeking summary judgment is entitled to
a judgment in its favor if there is no
genuine dispute about the pertinent
facts, and, based on those undisputed facts, the law compels a judgment
for the party who has asked for a
favorable ruling.
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